what is happening in that moment when deciding to get rid of something we have, or get a new item when it is available. then how does this play into personal finance and the overall economics of how a person decides to do this or that that could lead to hoarding. is there an economic lesson to be learned for personal finance. does this entire field branch over into behavioral economics? Do marketing companies take advantage of this? one could hoard money, but most cases I've seen people spend all of their money irresponsibly to gain more stuff that they do not need.
Yes — this is squarely behavioral economics, and the connection you intuit is real and well-documented.
The moment of decision. Acquiring and discarding are governed by partially separate neural systems, which is why they feel asymmetric. Acquisition is driven by anticipatory reward: the ventral striatum/nucleus accumbens activates in anticipation of getting the thing. Knutson's neuroeconomic work shows nucleus accumbens activation predicts purchasing, while insula activation (encoding the "pain of paying") predicts not purchasing — the buy decision is a race between approach-reward and anticipated-loss circuits. Critically, the anticipation is stronger than the possession (Berridge's "wanting" vs. "liking"); the pleasure decays rapidly after acquisition (hedonic adaptation). Discarding runs the opposite way: it registers as loss. In ordinary people this is the endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler) — mere ownership inflates an object's valuation, so we demand more to give something up than we would pay to acquire it. In hoarding disorder specifically, discarding one's own possessions triggers anterior cingulate and insula activity, interpreted as abnormally high emotional salience assigned to the discard decision.
The behavioral-economics mechanisms. The same machinery produces both object-hoarding and financial mismanagement:
(Caveat: the endowment effect's magnitude has been contested in the replication literature, but its existence is not seriously disputed.)
The personal-finance lesson. The central insight is that our reward wiring is biased toward concrete, immediate, emotionally-tagged acquisition over abstract, future, fungible security. Money is abstract; objects are specific and emotionally encoded — which is precisely why spending-to-acquire is a more common failure mode than hoarding-to-save. The practical lever is friction and defaults (Thaler & Sunstein's nudge framework): overspending reflects a low-friction acquisition environment and high-friction saving. Reversing that — automating savings, deleting saved payment methods, imposing a delay before purchases — works better than willpower because it intervenes before the reward circuit fires. A secondary lesson: because the pleasure of acquisition decays (adaptation), spending on experiences or on the anticipation itself yields more durable utility per dollar than accumulating goods.
Marketing exploitation — yes, deliberately and demonstrably. The consumer-marketing apparatus is in large part applied behavioral economics designed to trigger acquisition and suppress the brakes:
Your observed asymmetry — spending irresponsibly vs. hoarding money. Clinically coherent and distinct phenomena. Object-hoarding is attachment to things; the things carry meaning or security. Compulsive buying — proposed as Compulsive Buying-Shopping Disorder, an emerging but not yet fully settled behavioral-addiction diagnosis — is reinforcement in the act of acquiring, not in the object retained, which is why purchases often go unused or unopened, frequently followed by guilt. That matches exactly what you observe: the stuff is almost a byproduct; the buying is the behavior. Money-hoarding (pathological miserliness) is the inverse — money itself becomes the secure object, and spending triggers the loss-aversion distress. The bridge between compulsive buying and object-hoarding is "excessive acquisition," present in roughly 80–90% of hoarding cases (DSM-5's "with excessive acquisition" specifier). The three are related but separable: many compulsive buyers are not hoarders, and money-hoarders are typically neither.
(The unified causal narrative tying neural reward, behavioral-economics biases, and clinical syndromes into one mechanism is partly my synthesis; the individual components are established, but the integration is an interpretive frame, not settled doctrine.)